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n item in the Motley Fool recently caught our attention.  The article “Cisco vs. Lucent: The Flow Ratio 
Tells All” (by Matt Richey, June 6, 2000, in The Motley Fool.fool.com), introduced a new ratio that 
Richey claimed to be useful for measuring the investment worthiness of a company.  Since our 
Financial Statement Analysis course covers traditional ratio analysis and since we were exploring some research 
ideas on measuring liquidity, the Fool Ratio seemed worthy of investigation. 
 
In his article on the Flow Ratio, Richey stated: 
 
But, if I had to assess a company’s quality and prospects by looking at the trend of only a single financial 
metric, I’d choose a balance sheet metric called the Flow Ratio.  I’ve found this simple numeric to be the 
most revealing metric in my analytical toolbox. 
 
We decided to test the usefulness of the Flow Ratio as a predictor of stock price.  This paper reports the results of 
our study.  We start with the definition of the Flow Ratio and the benchmark value suggested by Richey.  Then, we 
describe our study and analyze the results.  The final section consists of concluding comments and suggestions for 
further relevant studies. 
 
The Flow Ratio 
 
 Richey’s article (6/6/2000) demonstrates how the Flow Ratio is computed, and then it demonstrates how the 
ratio is used.  First, the computation is as follows: 
 
                 Current Assets - Cash 
Flow Ratio   =   --------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Current Liabilities - Short-term Debt 
 
The logic behind the Flow Ratio goes like this: 
 
 It is best to see “as low a numerator as possible, since the numerator represents inventory, accounts 
receivable, and prepaid expense”. 
 
 Reverse your thinking for the denominator. As Richey explains, current liabilities represent goods and 
services which the company has already purchased and received but hasn’t yet paid for.  They represent a 
chance to get “something for nothing – for a short period of time, at least”.  The only “bad” type of current 
liability is short-term debt, because it carries interest charges.  Thus, short-term debt is subtracted from the 
current liabilities total.  We would like to see the denominator as high as possible.    
 
___________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
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 Therefore, using the logic for both the numerator and denominator, we would like to see a low value for the 
Flow Ratio.   
 
 Thus far, this seemed logical, and we thought that perhaps the Flow Ratio has some value when doing a 
financial analysis.  Initially, Richey and Gardner seemed to be proposing the ratio only as a measure of the 
effectiveness of managing working capital.  However, the illustration that they use to demonstrate the value of the 
Flow Ratio, also suggested that the Flow Ratio has additional usefulness, for predicting stock price.  This piqued our 
curiosity, since this is something analysts and investors have sought for decades.   
 
 Tom Gardner, in the early days of the Rule Maker Portfolio, invented the Flow Ratio.  In 1997, Gardner 
(“Fool Portfolio Report”, 9/4/97) suggested a cutoff for the Flow Ratio; “Any Flow Ratio below 1.00 reflects a 
company that appears to be very aggressively managed and whose products are in great demand. Conversely, any 
Flow Ratio above 2.00 reflects a company that appears to be managed sloppily and whose products aren't coveted.”  
On 8/7/00, Richey (“Lucent vs. Cisco: Go with the Flow”) stated that a Flow Ratio value below 1.25 is desirable.   
However, no basis for either cutoff value is given in any of the articles that we have seen from Motley Fool.  In 
addition, there appears to have been no empirical testing of the Flow Ratio to determine either averages or suggested 
benchmark figures.  We attempted to contact the Motley Fool to determine the basis for this cutoff, but we were 
referred to a chat room that shed no further light on the issue. 
 
 To illustrate the value of the Flow Ratio and its relationship to stock price Richey chose to compare Lucent 
with Cisco as follows: 
 
 As the above data show, both companies 
had a Flow Ratio near 1.45 at the end of 1997.  
However, the two companies have taken opposite 
roads since then; Cisco’s Flow Ratio had declined 
to .87 and Lucent’s Flow Ratio increased to 2.80 at 
March of 2000.  The trend in stock price for the 
two companies is the reverse, Lucent’s stock price 
almost tripled from $22.05 to $62.19 and Cisco’s 
price has increased over six times from $10.51 on 
12/97 to $69.33 on 3/00.  In addition, the Lucent 
price fell by over 30% from 3/00 to 8/00, while the 
Cisco price increased almost six-fold from $10.51 
to $69.33 during the same period.  The data 
suggests that Cisco has been doing a better job of 
managing its working capital, since the Flow Ratio 
for Cisco continually declined during the period 
while Lucent’s Flow Ratio almost doubled. 
 
 Apparently, Richey saw something more 
in the data, an inverse relationship between the 
change in the Flow Ratio and the change in stock 
price.  Thus, Richey concluded that the declining Flow Ratio for Cisco yields an increasing stock price.  In 
presenting the data and in his interpretation, Richey tries to draw this relationship between the Flow Ratio and stock 
price. He observed, “The disparity in the stock performance of the two companies sums up the importance of the 
Flow Ratio.  Since December 1997, a $1,000 investment in Lucent has become $1,922; in Cisco, your original 
$1,000 is now $6,238.  An eye to the Flow Ratio at any point along the way would’ve steered you to the better 
investment.”  Clearly, there is an implication here that better working capital management (i.e. low and declining 
Flow Ratio) leads to higher stock prices. 
 
Flow Ratio and Stock Price Lucent vs. Cisco 
 
     Lucent          Cisco 
     Flow       Stock   Flow Stock 
Date      Ratio       Price   Ratio  Price 
 
12/97        1.47        $22.05 1.44  $10.51 
03/98        1.56       $38.01  1.31  $12.21 
06/98        1.57        $46.07  1.17 $15.96 
09/98        1.69        $40.01 1.13 $18.84 
12/98        1.89       $56.19  1.12  $27.89 
03/99        2.03        $59.92  1.03 $28.52 
06/99        2.18        $65.62  0.87  $31.06 
09/99        2.26        $64.19 1.03  $44.59 
12/99        2.67        $55.48 0.99  $54.75 
03/00        2.80        $62.19 0.87 $69.33 
08/00*           2.89        $42.38  N/A $65.56 
 
CHANGE 90.5% 92.2% -39.6%  523.8%  
*The date shown in Motley Fool was 8/04, but probably was intended 
to be 8/00, since the article was written in 2000. 
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 Were Richey and Gardner on to something that could predict stock price?  We had hoped so, but this 
seemed too easy. This would be a tool of unlimited value for making stock investment decisions.  After all, one could 
take many pairs of companies, even within the same industry, compare a selected variable (such as the Flow Ratio) 
with stock price and find what appears to be a causal relationship.  Richey had not even conducted any statistical 
testing for such relationship.  Thus, the implied relationship between the Flow Ratio and stock price might not really 
exist.  In order to determine if any relationship between the Flow Ratio and stock price exits, appropriate statistical 




Lucent vs. Cisco 
 
 First, we decided to use the same two firms that Richey used in his illustration, Lucent and Cisco.  A visual 
examination of the scatter graph for these variables for Lucent and Cisco suggest a relationship between the Flow 
Ratio and stock price.  However, the nature of the relationships differs for the two firms.  For Cisco there is an 
inverse (negative) relationship (the lower the Flow Ratio, the higher the stock price); but for Lucent there is a 
positive relationship (the higher the Flow Ratio, the higher the stock price).  This was confirmed by the use of the 
appropriate statistical tests.  We conducted a least squares regression test for Lucent and Cisco for the ten periods 
used by Richey, and we found a significant relationship between stock price and the Flow Ratio.  For Lucent the F-
probability score was a very low .012775, and for Cisco it was an even lower .007638.  Thus, these statistical tests 
do show (95% confidence) that the Flow Ratio affects that stock price for these two companies.  However, the 
negative t-statistic for Cisco denotes an inverse relationship, while the positive t-statistic denotes a positive 
relationship.  The Adjusted R-squared statistic for the Lucent regression model was .51 while it was .56 for the Cisco 
model.  
 
 Because of these mixed findings for Lucent and Cisco, we decided to test for the relationship between the 
Flow Ratio and stock price at other companies.  First, we examined a group of six manufacturing companies; second, 




 We selected a group of six manufacturing companies, where working capital management would be 
considered very important.  We chose General Electric, General Motors, Harley Davidson, IBM, Johnson Controls, 
and Rockwell International.  The average Flow Ratio for this group of companies was 1.97, well above the cutoff of 
1.25 suggested by Richer.  Four of the companies had a Flow Ratio above the cutoff.  We computed the Flow Ratio 
for each company for the same periods (10 quarters) that Richey used for Lucent and Cisco.  Then we obtained stock 
prices for the same quarter.  We tested for a relationship between the Flow Ratio and stock price (as the dependent 
variable). The results of our tests are summarized below (significant items in bold print at the 95% confidence level): 
 
 
Flow Ratio and Stock Price Manufacturing Companies 
 
Firm        t-stat.   F-stat.                F-prob.         Stock Trend           Flow Trend           Flow Hi/Lo* 
 
General Electric     - 1.763  3.109255                .11586                Up                Flat                High 
General Motors     - 0.064   0.004142                .95026               Flat              Down                High 
Harley Davidson     - 0.467  0.218546                .65262                Up                Flat                High 
IBM      - 3.118   9.723647                .01426                     Up              Down                High 
Johnson Controls       0.450   0.202985                .66428             Down              Down                 Low 
Rockwell Int’l     - 0.835   0.006986               .93544             Down                Down                 Low 
*“Hi” indicates a Flow Ratio value above 1.25 and “lo” means below 1.25. 
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 If Richey’s observations about the relationship between the Flow Ratio and stock price were correct, then 
we should see a pattern that shows an “up” trend for stock price when the trend in the Flow Ratio trend is down.  In 
addition, where the stock price trend is down the Flow Ratio trend should be up (negative).  For the manufacturing 
firms, we see this relationship only for IBM.   For Johnson Controls and Rockwell both stock price and Flow Ratio 
are trending downward.  Of the eight firms, only Johnson Controls and Rockwell had a Flow Ratio below the 
suggested cutoff of 1.25. 
 
 We prepared scatter graphs for each company.  A visual examination of the graphs of stock price and Flow 
Ratio behavior suggested no relationship between the two variables for five the six companies, and only for IBM was 
there an apparent relationship.   More importantly, based on the statistical analysis of the results for the six 
companies selected, only IBM showed a significant relationship between stock price and Flow Ratio. Further 
evidence of this result is the Adjusted R-Squared statistic for each of the regression models: General Electric (.19), 
General Motors (-.12), Harley Davidson (-.10), IBM (.49), Johnson Controls  (-.10) and Rockwell International (-
.12).  Therefore, for the manufacturing firms, we cannot conclude that the Flow Ratio determines stock prices.   
 
Discount Retail Companies 
 
 Our study computed the Flow ratios and stock prices on a quarterly basis for eight discount retail 
companies.  We chose this industry because these discount retailers usually operate on low profit margins and need 
to have good working capital management.  We found that the average Flow Ratio for the retail companies was 
1.687, and five of the companies had a flow ratio above the proposed cutoff of 1.25.  The results were (significant 
items in bold print at the 95% confidence level): 
 
 Only three companies; Costco, Target and Wal-Mart had a Flow Ratio below the cutoff suggested by 
Motley Fool.  In addition, there is an inverse relationship between the trend in stock price and the Flow Ratio for 
only three of the companies, Costco, T J Max and Wal-Mart.  For three other companies, Dollar Tree Store, K-Mart, 
and Target, the trends in stock price and Flow Ratio are the same.  We found only one company, Wal-Mart, which 
had a significant relationship between stock price and the Flow Ratio.  The statistical tests for the other discount 
retail companies also show that stock prices for the discount retail companies are neither related to, nor dependent 
upon, the Flow Ratio. The Adjusted R-Squared statistic for each of the regression models supports these findings: 
Costco (-.12), Dollar General (.05), Dollar Tree (-.11), Family Dollar Store (-.04), K-Mart (-.09), Target (.11), TJ 
Max (-.12) and Wal-Mart (.74).  Thus, we do not see a pattern of an inverse relationship between stock price and 
Flow Ratio for the discount retail firms. 
 
 
Flow Ratio and Stock Price Discount Retail Companies 
 
Firm             t-stat.             F-stat.                F-prob.  Stock Trend        Flow Trend        Flow 
Hi/Lo* 
 
Costco              -0.154              0.023       0.8809         Up             Down        Low 
Dollar General              1.234              1.523       0.2520         Flat              Flat        High 
Dollar Tree Store              0.350              0.122       0.7349         Up             Up        High 
Family Dollar Store             0.818                       0.670       0.4365         Flat             Up        High 
K-Mart               0.476              0.226       0.6467        Down            Down        High 
Target              -1.437              2.066       0.1885        Down            Down        Low 
T J Max              -0.139              0.019       0.8923        Down            Up        High 
Wal-Mart             -5.114            26.155       0.0009        Up             Down        Low 









 Since many dot.com companies have experienced severe financial problems in recent years, we chose to 
look at a large number of firms in the industry.  We conducted two separate tests on dot.com firms. First, we made a 
broad examination of firms in the dot.com industry.  We computed the Flow Ratio for 183 firms in the industry.  We 
did the Flow Ratio computations quarterly for all quarters reported from 1997 to March of 2000.  For a few 
companies the data went back to 1996.  Following is a summary of those results.   
 
 Among the 183 dot.com companies, the average Flow Ratio was .721; well below the Flow Ratio averages 
for the manufacturing companies and discount retail companies.  In addition, we found that 99 (54%) companies had 
an increasing Flow Ratio, 76 (42%) companies had a decreasing Flow Ratio and 8 (4%) companies were either 
unchanged or had an insufficient number of quarters.  Among the 183 companies included in the dot.com industry, 
there were 44 companies with an average Flow Ratio greater than 1.25.  According to this cutoff of 1.25 proposed by 
Richey, these 42 companies (23% of the total) were in a danger zone with respect to working capital management:  
 
 
Companies With Low (<1.25) Flow Ratio Dot.Com Companies 
 
 AltiGen Comm  FreeShop.com  Net.Bank   Retek 
 AutoWeb.com  Garden.com  NetObjects  S1 Corporation 
 BreakawaySolutions  HearMe.com  NetPerceptions  Scient     
 CNET    InsWeb   NextCard   Secure Computing 
 Cybercash   InterNAPNtwk  OpenMarket  Spyglass 
 Cylink   IXL Enterprises  Pets.com   Stamps.com 
 Drkoop.com  Jfax.com   PlanetRx.com  Tut Systems 
 E Loan   MarketWatch.com   PurchasePro.com   V-1  
 eBenX   Medscape   Quepasa.com  WorldGate       
 Emusic.com  Metricom   Quokka Sports        
 E-Stamp   Mortgage.com  Ramp Ntwks    
 
 
 We did not conduct statistical tests of significance for the 183 firms.  However, we selected at random seventeen 
companies in the dot.com industry, and we performed statistical tests on them to measure the relationship, if any, between 
the Flow Ratio and stock price.  In addition, we looked at the trend in the Flow Ratio over the entire period.  The statistical 
results follow (significant items in bold print at the 95% confidence level): 
 
 
Flow Ratio and Stock Price Dot.Com Companies 
 
Firm      t-stat.  F-stat  F-prob.        Flow Ratio 
 
America Online  -1.3120  1.721  0.2375  Low (.47), increased 
CNET   -1.3661  1.866  0.3052  High (2.09) increased 
Cyber Cash  -0.7648  0.584  0.5249  Low (.87), no change 
Cylink    0.1379  0.019  0.9029  High (1.43), but down 
E-Trade    0.4327  0.187  0.7074  Low (.95), up slightly 
Infonautics   2.4086  5.801  0.1377  Low (.37), up slightly 
Lycos    2.9820  8.892  0.0965  Low (.97), up slightly 
Message Media   1.3912  1.935  0.2987  High (1.31) increased 
Metricom   -0.9408  0.885  0.3831  Low (.20), decreasing 
Newsedge    -3.4606  11.976  0.0406  Low (.62), up slightly 
Online Resources   0.3216  0.103  0.7782  Low (.96), up slightly 
Primix Solutions   0.6545  0.428  0.5800  High (1.36), increased 
PSI Net   -0.6510  0.423  0.5614  Low (.83), increased 
Secure Computing  -0.3608  0.130  0.7422  Low (.44), decreased 
S-One   -0.5662  0.320  0.6283  Low (.68), up slightly 
V-One    1.9282  3.718  0.1936  Low (.82), decreased 
Yahoo   -2.7089  7.338  0.1135  Low (.34), decreased 
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 For the 17 dot.com companies, the average Flow Ratio was .862.  This was much lower that the average 
Flow Ratio values for the manufacturing and discount retail firms.  This was quite surprising given the financial 
problems of the dot.com industry during the most recent few years.  In addition, only four of the companies (CNET, 
Cylink, Message Media and Primix Solutions) had a high (above 1.25) Flow Ratio.  Eleven (65%) of the 17 
companies had an increasing Flow Ratio, five (29%) had a decreasing Flow Ratio and one was unchanged.  Results 
of the statistical tests for the dot.com companies are consistent with those for the manufacturing companies and the 
discount retail companies.  We cannot find many significant relationships between the Flow Ratio and stock prices 
for the industries studied.  The only company of the 17 dot.com companies that showed a relationship between stock 
price and Flow Ratio was Newsedge with an F-Probability of .0406.  This is slightly under the 5% confidence level 
that we set for this test.  Consistent with the t-statistic results only four regression models had a positive Adjusted R-
Squared above .50: Infonautics (.61), Lycos (.72), Newsedge (.73) and Yahoo (.68).   
 
Summary For All Groups 
 
 We have found that the Flow Ratio does not correlate with stock price in any of the industry groups studied.  
Neither the Motley Fool (Matt Richey or Tom Gardner, who proposed the Flow Ratio) nor any other parties have 
computed Flow Ratios for large numbers of companies to get some averages and benchmark figures.  Instead, 
Motley Fool has apparently set an arbitrary cutoff value of 1.25 for the Flow Ratio.  We computed the average Flow 
Ratio value for each of the groups covered in our study as follows: 
 
Based on these averages, it is difficult to set a benchmark figure for 
the Flow Ratios.  As is the case with most ratios, benchmarks should 
be set by industry.   A benchmark of 1.25 might be too low for 
manufacturing and retail companies, but might be appropriate or 
slightly too high for the dot.com companies. 
 
 We can see that the dot.com companies have a much lower average for the Flow Ratio than do the 
manufacturing and discount retail companies.  These low values for the dot.com industry might reflect the fact that 
they have very large accounts payable and/or low levels of inventory and receivables.  While it is desirable to keep 
the non-cash current assets at low levels and non-interest-bearing payables at high levels, taking these to the extreme 
means that the Flow Ratio approaches a value of zero.  Eventually, the payables have to be paid, reducing the 




 The Motley Fool has proposed a number of different ratios for financial analysis of companies.  However, 
the ratio that Matt Richey touts as the most important in his analytical toolbox is the Flow Ratio.  The Flow Ratio is a 
measure of how well a firm manages its working capital, and the logic that Richey uses to support the ratio appears 
sound.  Firms should try to optimize their holdings in non-cash current assets and they should try to optimize their 
non-interest-bearing current liabilities.  Thus, a low Flow Ratio is desirable.   
 
 There is an implication in Richey’s statements about the Flow Ratio that there is an inverse relationship 
between the change in the Flow Ratio and the change in stock price.  To support this contention, Richey used data 
for Lucent and Cisco to suggest that the firm with the lowest Flow Ratio will have higher stock prices.  Since our 
statistical testing found mixed results regarding this relationship for Lucent and Cisco, we decided to apply the test to 
other companies.    
 
 In addition, until this study was conducted there has been no statistical testing for the relationship between 
the Flow Ratio and stock price.  The findings of our study contradict the claims made regarding the value of the Flow 
Ratio for predicting stock price.  Our study computed the quarterly Flow Ratio and stock prices for Lucent and 
Cisco, eight manufacturing companies, eight discount retail companies, and seventeen dot.com companies.  For each 
Average Flow Ratios 
 
-  Manufacturing Companies  1.970 
-  Discount Retail Companies   1.687 
-  Dot.com (17) Companies    .862 
-  Dot.com (183) Companies    .721 
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of the groups studied, we found only one case with a significant statistical relationship between the Flow Ratio and 
stock prices.   
 
 The Motley Fool suggests other ratio benchmarks or cutoff figures: the Cash King Margin of 10%, the 
Return on Invested Capita greater than 11% and cash no less than 1.5 times current liabilities.  As is the case for the 
Flow Ratio, we find that the Motley Fool provides neither logical nor empirical bases for these benchmarks.  
Researchers could conduct tests to obtain averages and benchmarks for these additional measures. 
 
 We see some possibilities for additional research related to the Flow Ratio and for other ratios and 
benchmarks suggested by the Motley Fool.  Researchers could test for differences between failed (bankrupt or 
liquidated) and non-bankrupt companies on the basis of the Flow Ratio.  The Flow Ratio might also be compared 
with other measures of financial performance such as earnings or gross profits.  However, given our findings we do 
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